Exploring Roots of Terrorism

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Factors of Individual Motivation
Terrorism has a long history, but its systematic analysis has a short past. Within this relatively brief period of time, spanning perhaps not much longer than three decades, analytical literature on the causes of terrorism has simply mushroomed. The rate of publications of academic and journalistic books and articles is getting even more accelerated since the days when the United States and other western countries started to feel its nefarious effects. Despite its sheer volume and diversity, if there are a few thin but resolute threads that run through this rapidly burgeoning literature, they are:

- It is nearly impossible to define “terrorism.”
- The link between sociopolitical and economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, etc. and terrorism is weak
- There is no single profile of a “terrorist”

All of these above conclusions define the contours of not what we know, but what we don’t know about terrorism. In favor of this meager harvest, we may do well to recall the Socratic wisdom: “What you know may be less important than what you don’t know.”

Facing such a conundrum in looking for the “root causes” of terrorism, in this article, I would like to start with a different approach. Any act of “terrorism,” however defined, is a collective action, a quintessential political act taken in the name of a group based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism, or

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1 For some of the earlier behavioral explanations of political violence, see Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, 1969: Gurr, 1970; Hibbs, 1973).
ideological orientation.² If it were not, it would fall under the category of common criminal behavior, undertaken solely for the enrichment of the participants. Hence, in our quest for the “root causes” I begin with asking the question: why do people participate in collective actions?

Comparison between what an individual might feel and in the midst of a deeply religious or ideological movement, or during a horrific sectarian violence and what psychiatrists and psychologists might term as “paranoia,” “schizophrenia” or “delusion” is inevitable. For instance, Glass (1985:38) notes: “It occurs to me after listening for several months to the delusional utterances that some connection may exist between internal emotional structures and construction of ethical, political systems of belief.” He further adds that in their delusion, his patients, similar to demagogues and their followers all over the world, develop a more or less coherent belief system. This belief system is characterized by inner images of sharp dichotomies between good/bad, God/devil, American/communists, black/white,” (P. 61) and so on. A number of psychiatrists have sought causes of abnormal behavior, which allows people to target innocent people through individual personality traits (Akhtar, 1999; Haroun, 1999). Investigations by other clinical psychologists have also produced a mixed bag of tangible outcomes. For instance, Sarraj (2002), a noted Palestinian psychologist argues that the primary motivations behind suicide bombing is a mix of guilt, shame, and an overwhelming desire to avenge the perceived injustice wrought to their land by the Israeli authorities.³ Others have found evidence of repressed sexual fantasies in the young men (Konet 2001) and women (Morgan, 2002) in their decision to participate in the acts of self-immolation. Yet, the problem with such analyses is that two separate individuals are not chased by the same demon; mental illness, unlike infectious diseases do not contaminate an entire population.

Among social scientists, only economists make explicit behavioral assumptions. They argue that individuals participate in an action if, in their estimation, their benefits resulting from their involvement outweighs the costs. That is:

\[
\text{Benefits} - \text{Cost} > 0 \quad (1)
\]

² Although there is no general official definition of terrorism, there are many functional descriptions. For instance, Wilkinson (2001: 206) describes it as a special form of political violence with five characteristics:
1. It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror.
2. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence.
3. It inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians.
4. The acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the literal sense that they breach social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage; and
5. Terrorism is generally used to try to influence political behaviour in some way: for example, to force opponents into conceding some or all of the perpetrators demands, to provoke an over-reaction, to serve as a catalyst for more general conflict or to publicise a political or religious cause, to inspire followers to emulate violent attacks, to give vent to deep hatred and the thirst for revenge, and to help undermine governments and institutions designate as enemies by the terrorists.”

³ On this also see Butler (2002).
The introduction of “rational choice” hypothesis has expanded the domain of economics significantly. Originally developed to explain market behavior, economic principles have been used to explain a wide array of human activities from criminal behavior (Becker, 1976) to marriage (Grossbard-Sechtman, 1993) and even to the choice of religious faith (Innaccone, 2002). The assumption of self-utility maximization, however, runs into two interrelated conceptual problems in explaining collective action (Olson, 1965). First, the problem with explaining collective action with the assumption of self-interest is that these acts are undertaken for the welfare of the entire group. Hence, the benefits stemming from their attainment cannot be restricted to those who would be participating. Second, to the participants, the outcome is not be directly linked to the effort, particularly when the group size is large. Let me explain the problems.

Suppose, there are two individuals both of whom would benefit from a political change (e.g., the removal of a tyrant from power, or even going to vote in a national election to choose a candidate). Suppose there are two individuals: one has decided to participate in an act of political dissidence, the other has not. In our formulation it would appear as:

\[ \text{Participant} = \text{Benefit} - \text{cost} \]  
\[ \text{Non-participant} = \text{Benefit} \]  

As we can see from the above formulations, since a non-participant does not have to pay any cost (from loss of time, income to even loss of life) to get benefits from a collective good, there is no reason for any rational human being to participate in a collective action. Furthermore, as the group size increases, a single participant’s contribution to the cause becomes increasingly insignificant. A single voter cannot affect the outcome of a national election. Nor can a single Islamic suicide bomber expect to establish a global Islamic state with his or her sacrifice. Therefore, nobody would have any reason to contribute to a collective cause. Thus, the conclusion of this line of argument is that having realized the insignificance of his or her own participation, for instance, in bringing about a free Palestinian state no rational Palestinian would ever join an act of rebellion against Israel. As a result, no collective action will be undertaken, no war will ever be fought, and much of what we see around us as public goods will cease to exist. In the literature, this is known as the Olson’s Paradox or, alternately, Social Dilemma (Olson 1965). The reason it is important to start from this theoretical perspective is because otherwise, while looking for “root causes” of terrorism we would have to assume that those who take part in the acts of dissidence while sacrificing their own welfare are either irrational beings or are masking their ulterior motives of selfish goals with claims of ideology, religion, or nationalism (Tullock, 1971). The most pressing problem with the traditional economic assumption of self-utility maximization is that it provides us with a truncated view of a human rationality, which ultimately can lead to faulty policy prescriptions for eliminating the threats of terrorism.

In order to overcome the Paradox, I have proposed an expanded behavioral assumption, which combines individuals’ self-utility along with
their desire for a greater welfare of the groups in which they choose of belong (Gupta, 1990, 2001, 2002). In my expanded formulation, individuals maximize their self-utility (personal welfare) as well as what they perceive as their group-utility or the welfare of their entire group. Thus, my expanded formulation states an individual maximizes:

\[
\text{Participant} = \text{Personal benefit} + \text{Group benefit} - \text{Cost}
\]  

Therefore, according to my assumption of human behavior, a rational individual can join a collective action even if his or her own net personal welfare is negative, as long as the perceived benefits to the group is large enough to compensate for these losses. I argue that unless we understand the need for an individual to belong to a group and strive for its betterment, we will not understand the motivation of human beings as social animals. Furthermore, the perception of group welfare is the result of a number of external factors, such as, socialization process, religious beliefs, culture and, perhaps most importantly, the influence of a leader, known in the literature as a “political entrepreneur.” These “political entrepreneurs,” from Carlos Marighela to Osama bin Laden, mix history, religion, and mythology to “frame” an issue, thereby creating a coherent story, replete with the archetypes of “good” and “evil,” that resonates with a large number of people. Their vision defines the contours of the group identity for their followers, who respond with violent actions (Gupta, 2001). These visions are spread through fiery sermons in the mosques, taught in the madrassas (religious schools), and through political speeches (Stern, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000). For instance, having interviewed 35 incarcerated terrorists in the Middle East, Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003: 176) correctly observe that in the process of becoming a soldier for a cause a recruit submerges his/her identity to the collective: “As an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making.” Hence a proper understanding of the root causes of terrorism must include both economic as well socio-psychological dimensions of human motivations.

This expanded behavioral precept carries two broad implications. First, it implies that political grievance is a necessary factor but not a sufficient cause for terrorism. In other words, there can be a wide-ranging social, political, economic, and even religious grievances in the society, but, following the predictions of the Olson’s Paradox, these will not necessarily lead to violence. Political violence takes place when a leader gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social construction of collective identity, and paints in vivid color the images of “us” and “them.” Since factors of structural deprivation are only the necessary condition, any attempt to correlate terrorism and other acts of political violence with poverty and lack of political or religious freedom will only produce a weak statistical correlation. By drawing the same line of reasoning we can clearly see why researchers fail to find a stable profile of a terrorist. None of the 19

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4 The importance of “framing” with the use of symbols has been extremely well researched. For a theoretical discussion, see Schuessler (2000) and for empirical verifications in the area of political science, see, Nelson and Oxley, (1999)
perpetrators of the 9-11 attacks suffered from poverty, lack of education or lack of exposure to the privileged life style of the Western world. Few of them, were literal followers of the Qur’an. The reason they took part in this action is because they felt inspired by a group of Islamic preachers and revolutionaries, like Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{5} Since the existence of a “political entrepreneur” presents us with the “sufficient” cause, and their rise cannot be predicted, it is not be possible to develop a predictive model for the rise of terrorism based on factors of deprivation alone. However, at the same time, when a group is formed, it would follow its interest, which would include among others, advancement of its ideological position, increase influence among its constituents, and promote power, influence, and even financial gains of the group and its leader(s).

Second, my expanded behavioral model indicates that those who would participate in acts of political dissidence would not have a single motivating factor. By examining my proposed formulation in equation (4), we can see that in any movement, there will be those who would participate because participation offers them opportunities for promoting their selfish interests, by offering them the ability to loot, rape, acquire power, or simply, respect of their followers. I call them the “mercenaries.” Also, in any political movement, we are likely to encounter those for whom the primary motivating force is ideology or the desire to enhance the welfare of the entire group. I call them the “ideologues” or “true believers.” Finally, we will find in a group of participants whose presence can be accounted for their fear (cost) of not going along with the group. I call them the “captive participants.” It is important to point out that these three basic sources of motivation, greed (self-utility), ideology (group-utility), and fear (cost) are often indistinguishable from each other. We can only gauge their importance by analyzing the revealed preferences of the group members. For instance, one cannot say, without invoking serious flaw of circular reasoning that those who are taking part in suicide bombings are doing so to maximize their individual utility. Similarly, when groups engage in kidnapping, and drug trafficking, many of its members become more interested in their own selfish interests. The infusion of large sums of money can truly change the character of a political movement. Reflecting the multiplicity of motivations, primarily between ideology and profit motive, we can see that terrorist groups all over the world, engage in combating their adversaries based on their most favoured tactics.

The Global Pattern of Violent Protest
Although data on terrorism are difficult to obtain, of late a number of research outfits are engaged in collecting relevant information. In this article, I have used data provided by the Israeli-based, the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) (http://www.ict.org.il/). This website provides the most comprehensive information on each event of

\textsuperscript{5} It is interesting to note that followers of al-Qaida offer a substantially different socio-economic profile from those groups operating in Isreal. For instance, the study by Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003) reveals the portrait of an individual without much hope, Sageman (2004) finds quite a different profile of the al-Qaida operatives.
terrorism and is available in public domain. Also, Pape (2003) provides us with a dataset on suicide attacks. For this study, I have combined the two sources to create a more complete dataset.

Based on the dataset compiled by the ICT I have presented activities of a number of significant terrorist organizations around the world in Table 1. This Table presents a thumbnail portrait of these groups indicating the specialized nature of the terrorist groups. Each cell of the Table indicates the percentage of each activity for the groups. The last row presents the sum of the three most prevalent acts of violence as a percentage of each group’s total activities. From this list we can easily discern the specialized nature of the various groups. For instance, the Basque Homeland and Freedom Party (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army’s activities are primarily concentrated on bombings, car bombings, and shootings (96 percent and 94 percent of their total activities). The Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) prefers car bombing, shooting, and hostage taking (90%). The Islamic rebel group of the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on the other hand specialize in kidnapping and hostage taking. They comprise 91 percent and 82 percent of their respective activities.

Similarly, only a handful of the world’s terrorist organizations engage in suicide bombings. Of the 52 major groups listed by the ICT, only 10 engage in suicide bombings. From this Table, it is apparent that the Hamas and the PIJ follow the path of violence by choosing to concentrate on suicide bombings, shootings, and knife attacks. Thus, we can clearly see that violent opposition groups do not choose their weapons of terror in a random fashion but are guided by their internal organizational logic. It is also interesting to note that among the major groups, listed in Table 1, only the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) seems to be less specialized in its choice of terrorist activities. Their top three activities comprise a relatively low 62.1% of their total activities. Since suicide attacks are a specialized activity, I have presented their frequencies in Table 2.

In order to empirically establish the clustering of terrorist activities, we performed a Principal Component Factor Analysis on the data of 17 most active groups in the world. The results, shown in Table 3 clearly demonstrate the validity of our hypothesis. I have arranged the components according to their highest loading within their factor in the five categories. This Table further bolsters the argument that dissident groups do not choose their activities randomly, but do so with careful consideration; they pick those, which are closest to their ideology, expertise, opportunity, and the general modus operandi. Let us look at the logic of association of violent activities as identified by Factor Analysis. We may have a deeper understand of the categories by focusing on the activities that load the highest within each category. Thus, suicide bombings define the first

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6 These groups include, the Abu Sayyaf Group (the Philippines), Al-Aqsa Brigade, Al-Qaida, Basque Homeland and Freedom Party (ETA: Spain), Fatah, Fatah-Tanzim, Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas, Hizballah, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK:Turkey), Lashkar-e-Toiba (Kashmiri Separatist group), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE: Sri Lanka), Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path: Peru).
category and we can call it the *ideological terrorists*, since these are inspired by ideological fervour (Hamas), religious extremism (the PIJ and Al-Qaida) and personal charisma of a leader (the LTTE). We call them “ideological” because apart from the technical know how and complex logistical needs to carry out a successful suicide attack, the act needs supremely dedicated cadres who would be willing to give their lives for the cause. This is so rare in the world of violent conflict that only a handful of the groups can have a ready supply of suitable candidates. If we examine the other activities within this factor, we see that shootings and grenade attacks require being physically close to the target, which indicates the assumption of considerable personal risk by the attacker.

In contrast, the second category of attacks is designed for groups with specific professional skills. They include bombings and car bombings, which involve a number of specialized skills, but usually are seldom motivated by acts of religious zealotry, although religion may be one of their principal reasons for conflict. These attacks are usually done with remote control devices, which allow the attackers time to escape. The IRA (see, Coogan, 2002) and the ETA (Alexander, Swetnam, Levine, 2002) fall in this category. We would call these groups, *Professional Terrorists*.

The third category of activities are promoted primarily by the groups need to make financial gain. These groups -- such as the FARC in Colombia (Pulido and Alberto, 1996) and the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines (Roger, 2004) preferences are revealed through hostage taking and kidnapping. Their vehicle attacks are usually related to the attempts of taking hostages. Since the hostages are held for ransom, and usually for quite a large amount, we may conjecture that those taking part in these are motivated primarily by their personal pecuniary considerations. In other words, we may expect to find a larger proportion of what I call “mercenaries” among these groups. We may call them *anomic terrorists*, since they attempt to operate within an environment of anomie or lawlessness and thrive in failed states or in nations with weakened central control.

For the fourth group, we may call them *Hooligan terrorists*, since their activities (arson and vandalism) do not usually require specialized skill or disciplined self-sacrifice. Although, in the Factor Analysis, they form a separate category, we find no group in our list, depend primarily of these activities.

The fifth group consists of two separate components, each with a single activity, lynching and stoning. We can conceptually consider them to be expressions of a single type, which we call *vigilante terrorists*. These activities require a large number of participants resembling more of mob violence than acts of covert planning and execution by a small band of people, typical of other terrorist acts.

I have presented Figure 1, which summarizes my categorization of the various terrorist groups and their operations. Based on a-priori logic this diagram presents a picture that shows the typical need for organizational capability and ideological strength in carrying out various kinds of terrorist activities. We can safely conjecture that it takes the greatest amount of organizational skills along with ideological strength to turn individual followers into a living H(uman)-bomb; the smartest of weapons in the
arsenal of any nation. We may also hypothesize that as we move from right to left along the X-axis, violent acts of political dissidence turns increasingly from a law and order problem to a political problem.

Empirical evidence suggests (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, 1993) that the relationship between government coercion and political violence is essentially shaped like an inverted-U; lower levels of coercion only adds fuel to the fire of dissent, while dissident activities can be brought down beyond a certain point of high violence and high coercion by resorting to an extreme forces of brutality. This research also found that this point of draconian force is generally beyond the capabilities of democratic nations. Thus, what Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and their likes could do to bring down political opposition cannot be done within the constitutional limits imposed by liberal democracies. Therefore, in democracies, a solution to the problems of terrorism with a high ideological content must be sought within the political arena and not the battle field.

Evolution of Choice of Terrorist Strategies
In this article, we set out to look for the “root causes” of terrorism. In our pursuit we have presented a complex picture of multiple motivations. The world of terrorism that is currently threatening basic fabrics of the western world cannot be understood without shedding some of the popular misperceptions that are drawn from the media, which portrays them as religious fanatics or simply blood thirsty sociopaths. Tamil Tigers are not inspired by religious fanaticism. Nor can many of the suicide bombers be comfortably classified as religious zealots. It is religion and ethnic nationalism that are being used by the political entrepreneurs which give rise to acts of terrorism.

The most interesting question that can be raised from our taxonomy of the terrorist groups and motivations is whether these groups evolve over time from low level of terrorism based on widespread feelings of frustration and anger to the most destructive kind, inspired by deep ideological orientation, group cohesion, over-reaction of their adversaries and/or attachment to a charismatic leader. For instance, available data do lend limited support to the hypothesis that a number of terrorist groups start out with lesser attacks and then due to repression and other external events change into more deadly forms of attacks. For instance the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka evolved from a small band of rebels to full-blown terrorist organization with estimated income of $100 million dollars per year (Gunaratna, 2001:188). As the movement progressed so did their terrorism strategies (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 1994; Narayan Swamy, 1994).

To illustrate the point of evolving strategy, I have provided a plot of suicide bombing within Israel (Figure 2). Hamas, a product of the first Intifada movement was involved primarily in small scale attack events in

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7 For alternate explanation of relationship between repression and dissent, see, Moore (1998).
8 It is interesting to note that while extreme coercion may work to put down active opposition in the most repressive regimes in the short run, it is questionable whether such policies would succeed over a longer period of time. Pol Pot was defeated, the Soviet System eventually collapsed, and the future prospect of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party is difficult to predict.
the late 1980’s. However, the demonstrated effectiveness of Hizballah’s suicide attacks in Lebanon in driving out the Americans and then the Israelis contributed toward the choice of suicide bombings by the Hamas in the early 1990s. The successes of Hamas, in turn, prompted a much smaller radical group the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to follow suite. Being increasingly sidelined by the Israelis and the PLO during the Oslo peace process, the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad responded with a sustained series of suicide bombings.9 However, when it became apparent that the peace process had come to a dead end, in desperation, to maintain support among the disaffected youths in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PLO affiliated groups, the Fatah, Fatah-Tanzim, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the newly created Al-Aqsa Brigade unleashed a relentless campaign of suicide bombings.10

Discussion of Findings
Serious study of terrorism must start with the proper understanding of human motivations for joining terrorist organization. In this article, I have attempted to fuse economic reasoning with those of social psychology to formulate a more comprehensive framework within which questions of “root causes” of terrorism can be understood. Based on my theoretical model along with the findings of the existing literature on terrorism bring us to the following conclusions:

1. *Distinguish among ideologies.* We have to learn to distinguish among ideologies that threaten, versus those that do not threaten the western world and the larger global community. For instance, the transnational ideologies of Pan Islamism of today, professed by the likes of Osama bin Laden, similar to the ideology of global communism of the 1970’s pose a far greater threat to the Western world than does the nationalistic fervor of groups such as the Hamas and the LTTE of Sri Lanka. However, danger emanating from these groups with limited global objective may menace the world in a different way, through their nexus with organized crime.

2. *Not all grievances are baseless.* In our zeal to fight terrorist atrocities, it is easy disregard legitimate grievances. Although absolute poverty and other aspects of economic deprivation have a weak link to terrorism, a pervasive sense of humiliation and hopelessness does not. The global community must recognize the need to address the legitimate grievances of disaffected people in a meaningful way. Without addressing the legitimate grievances of a large segment of the populace will only add fuel to the fire of resentment and will increase threats of terrorism.

3. *Recognize the power of communication.* Since it is extremely important to have the presence of a strong ideology to overcome collective action problem, we must realize the power of political discourse that reduces another group of people as contemptible enemies. It is indeed difficult

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9 For a rational choice explanation of strategic behavior by the rebell groups, see Kydd and Walter (2002), also see Pape (2003).
10 For a detailed discussion, see Gupta and Mundra (2003).
for western democracies, established on the foundation of free speech to recognize the danger resulting for it. However, incendiary potential of unrestrained incitement to a small group of people cannot be minimized. Hence, we must pay a great deal of attention to hate speech coming from the leadership of various groups from all around the world. Whenever possible, the global community must find ways of discouraging the sponsorship of hate.

4. Don’t play with peoples’ extreme emotions. If we look at the history of most of the extremist groups, particularly those that are based on religious fundamentalism, we find that they were promoted by governments as a strategic deterrent to some other force. For instance, the United States found it expedient to befriend religious zealots and to direct their fury toward the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi found Sikh religious extremist group to be a good ally against a moderate political party that was about to defeat the Indian Congress Party in a state election. There is evidence to suggest that for some time the Israeli government saw the Hamas as a counter weight to Mr. Arafat and the PLO. In each of these cases, it backfired; the US support for the Mujahideens produced Osama bin Laden and the Talibans, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by the Sikh extremists, Hamas became the largest source of suicide attacks within Israel.

5. Don’t over react. Understand the aims of the extremists. The causes of the extremist groups are best served when the society becomes polarized. For instance Hamas routinely stages suicide bombings and other acts designed to create outrage among the Israelis at critical points of peace process and national elections. In such a situation, the organized governments must resist the temptation to dig into national anger and mete out collective punishment. Instead, they may do well to draw upon the natural wellspring of human sympathy at the sight of tragedy to promote the moderate middle.

6. Reach political accommodation whenever possible. There are limits to power when it comes to applying coercion within a constitutional democracy. Therefore, democracies cannot hope to bring order through police and military action alone. Whenever possible, it is best to come to a political compromise with the dissident groups, particularly when there is a broad based popular support for the groups’ stated goals.

7. Constrict the life-blood of the terrorist groups by restricting money. Money is the life-blood of any organization, including the ones waging clandestine wars. These funds come from both illegitimate and legitimate sources. Study of terrorist group funding reveal a consistent pattern of fund raising. Some of the funds come from trafficking in drugs, cigarette, alcohol, etc. Others are raised through small contributions by the domestic constituents as well as the Diaspora. Also, it is not unusual for a dissident group to acquire a few extremely wealthy financiers. Money can also be raised by laundering money and investing them into legitimate businesses. Finally, many terrorist groups are funded by state sponsorship. If we are to stop the scourge of international terrorism the political leadership must develop a global consensus to stop the flow of money.
8. **Battle against terrorism must be fought on ideological grounds also.** Battle against terrorism cannot be fought only on military grounds. We must recognize that the allure of such movements is also group-centric. Therefore, if there is any hope of controlling terrorism it must come from offering ideological alternatives to the people. This may require long term planning in the educational system, social service delivery, and the use of the media promoting ideals of tolerance.

9. **Use more human intelligence rather than scientific surveillance.** Terrorists wage people oriented wars. From the earliest writings on terrorism and guerrilla warfare, it has been recognized that the terrorists use their ability to melt into the general populace. Therefore, its suppression would require infiltration and other aspects of surveillance based on human assets.

10. **No one country can address the issue of multinational terrorism unilaterally.** Since terrorism is rarely confined within the political boundaries of a single nation, we need to recognize the need for multinational approach for its suppression. Given the fact no country wants to give up its political and/or ideological position by defining terrorism (evinced by the absence of a universal definition of terrorism accepted by the United Nations), the international community should at least consider terrorism, case by case and act multi-laterally to suppress its most virulent forms, particularly those, which deliberately aim at mass murder of civilians.

11. **Be realistic in expectation.** We must know that while terrorism be totally eradicated, with time, the allure of specific ideologies may wane. In the past, there were many terrorist movements – particularly the radical Marxist groups – that posed great threats to the global community, but ultimately became spent forces. As scholars, we must devote much greater effort in understanding the dynamics of their demise. The most troubling aspect of terrorism is that with the advent of technology in the areas of communication, transportation, and the capability of the weapons, the ability of the future terrorist groups to bring widespread death and destruction is going to increase exponentially. Given this frightening scenario, the government leaders are well advised to increase their support of terrorism studies.

12. **What we are fighting against and what we are fighting for.** If the clash is about conflicting world views, we cannot win by attempting to destroy political extremism by becoming extremists ourselves. Our fight must be waged under the universally accepted norms and standards of human rights and procedural justice. If there is a conflict between civilizations, in our fight against terrorism, we must not lose sight of what we are fighting for.
Table 1. Comparison of Profiles of 10 Terrorist Groups (1980-2002)
(Percent of total activities)

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<td>7.9</td>
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<td><strong>91.0</strong> (bombing, Hostage Taking, Kidnapping)</td>
<td><strong>73.3</strong> (car bombing, bombing, suicide attacks)</td>
<td><strong>96.1</strong> (bombing, car bombing, shooting)</td>
<td><strong>81.6</strong> (bombing, hostage taking, kidnapping)</td>
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Activities of Terrorist Organizations, 1980-2002
Source: www.ict.org.il/
Table 2
Incidents of Suicide Attacks
(1980 – 2002)

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<th>Groups</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
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Source: Pape (2003) and ICT
### Table 3

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Cumulative percentage of explained variance 89.0%
Figure 1
Classification of Terrorist Groups and Their Ideologies

Political solution  Law and order solution

High

Organizational Capabilities

Low

LTTE    IRA    Abu Sayyaf
Hamas   ETA    FARC
PIJ     Sandero Luminoso

Ideological strength

High    Low

Ideological     Professional     Anomic     Hooligan     Vigilante
Figure 2

Suicide Bombings by the Rebel Groups within Israel and the Palestinian Territories

Assassination of the "Engineer"
References


